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In 1998, after a contentious debate, California became
the only state to enact a health care statute broadly
mandating insurers to reimburse all surgical procedures
that fall within its definition of "reconstructive
surgery."1 There are two pending class action lawsuits
alleging that two large insurers are in violation of the
California statute by failing to cover certain surgical
procedures within its definition of "reconstructive
surgery."
Under the current California statute, health care
service plans are mandated to reimburse a much
greater spectrum of surgeries, including non-medically
necessary surgical procedures with the sole purpose of
creating an aesthetically "normal appearance."' The
plaintiffs in the two suits claim the insurers are in
violation of the statute by applying a blanket policy
of denying reimbursement for all reconstructive
surgery claims to remove excess skin following
weight loss due to bariatric surgery (a broad term
including gastric bypass surgery), a treatment for
morbid obesity. IThis surgical procedure highlights
the statute's imperm issibly ambiguous construction
and illustrates how a common and costly surgery, not
falling precisely into the statute's broad definition of
reconstructive surgery, is causing conflicts between
patients and insurers over what procedures are eligible
for insurance coverage.
T-his article argues that the California legislature
delegated an improper amount of discretionary
authority to the Department of Managed Health
Care (DMHC),. the administrative agency tasked to
enforce this statute, by allowing unelected agency
officials to unconstitutionally exercise legislative
power. By failing to draft more instructive standards
for the agency to follow, the California statute violates
the nondelegation doctrine by assigning legislative
laxw making power to an administrative agency.
Part II details the difference between reconstructive and
cosmetic surgery, outlines the contentious debate over
passing the California law, notes the claims made in the
first significant pending class action suits brought under
the statute's provision defining reconstructive surgery,
and introduces the nondelegation doctrine as a method
of challenging the constitutionality of overly broad
delegations of legislative power. Part III argues that
the California statute is unconstitutional for violating
the nondelegation doctrine. Part IV suggests several
policy recommendations for future health care
statutes, and more specifically, recommends that
future healthcare statutes not broadly and ambiguously
mandate insurance coverage for an expansive
class of surgeries and instead, narrowly target the
eligible individuals like the Federal Women's Health
and Cancer Rights Act of 1998 (WHCRA). The
article concludes that the California statute should
either be constitutionally challenged because of its
impermissibly ambiguous delegation of lawmaking
power or amended to allow greater predictability and
guidance for the DMC Jto follow.
IL Background
A\ Thie D eneBetwee. n Rcntutv
As surgical procedures become increasingly common
avenues of patient treatment regimes and the cost of
health care concurrently rises, an inevitable conflict
arises between the insurers and patients as to what
procedures should elicit insurance coverage. The
AmericanMedicalAssociation(ANfA) defines cosmetic
surgery, not covered under most insurance policies, as
surgery "performed to reshape normal structures of
the body in order to improve the patient's appearance
and self-esteem." Ihe AMA defines reconstructive
surgery as surgery "performed on abnormal structures of
the body. caused by congenital defects, developnental
abnormalities, trauma, infection, tumors or disease" and
is "generally performed to improve fInction, but may
also be done to appioximate a noimal appearance."'
The Califoinia statute's definition ot reconstructive
surgery and cosmetic surgery closely parallels the
AMA's respective definitions.9 lloWever, the statute, like the AMA's
definition, does not define the meaning of several provisions. Prior to the
enactment of the California statute. insurance companies only covered
medically necessary procedures. By adopting a standard that allows non-
medically necessary procedures for the purpose of creating a "normal
appearance," the current law mandates insurers to cover an increasingly
large amount of surgeries.io
When certain surgical treatments create other conditions that might not
functionally impair the patient, problems arise as to the necessary conditions
that must be present to receive additional coverage." Given the increasing
number of obese Americans, a significant issue for insurers nationwide is
whether the surgical removal of excess skin following bariatric surgery for
obesity is a covered procedure.12
Iariatric surgery, which includes gastric bypass surgery, is now a common
treatment option for the disease of obesity.i As a result of this increase
in the surgery's popularity as well as its improved safety and efficacy, more
patients are seeking insurance reimbursement for excess skin removal,
claiming the excision of the skin that fails to contract following bariatric
surgery is a reconstructive and not a cosmetic procedure."g
A problem arises with classify ing this surgery as reconstructive under the
statute's definition because the excess skin is not caused by a "disease"
itself, but rather indirectly by the surgical procedure treating the disease of
obesity.' Thus, the lawmaker's legislative intent as to whether a disease
causes the excess skin is unclear given the statute's nebulous language.6
Under the current California statute, in order to warrant insurance coverage
for the reconstructive skin excision surgery following bariatric surgery, the
excess skin must be both an abnormal structure of the body caused by a
disease and must either improve function or create a normal appearance, to
the extent possible.'
B, The Conie ten tious Deba,,,te Ove,,r lthe C"afiliforni"a Law
California is the only state with a law both defining cosmetic and
reconstructive surgery and mandating every health care service plan to
cover what it defines as "reconstructive surgery." -Prior to the current
law's enactment, health care service plans that included hospital or surgical
benefits covered reconstructive surgery tor the purpose ofrestoring function,
but not purely to restore normal appearance as the current law does."
The California Society of Plastic Surgeons (CSPS) lobbied for legislation,
citing instances when insurance companies would deny coverage for
surgery that xxould correct phy sical deformities in patients, often children.20~
T he insurers claimed these surgeries xxere not nmedically inecessary because
a person could continue to normally tunction without undeigoing the
procedure.2
Durino thc leoislativc dcbate oxver this lass, an eclectic body of interest
groups expressed opinions.22 Adsvocates for the hill favored broad
coxverage of surgeries, statiing tlhat insurers should not haxve the ability to
deiny cosverage of reconstructixve surgery to repair plhysical abinormalities.2'
\dsvocates xxerc concerned wxith the trend among insurers to employ cost-
cutting measures that they believed negatixvely affected patient care.24
Othier supporters believed that denying coverage flor physical abnormalities
may also hasve a negative psychological impact on the patient.25
Opponents of the legislation argued that the bill created an ambiguous order
that is extremely difficult to implement.26 Further, opponents believed
that this legislation would make reconstructive surgery susceptible to
fraud and would cost an inordinate amount of resources to implement and
maintain.
C, An ,- Ov erv I'"ew of the Pending Clfri Cases Regarding
Health-,i & Safety vCode 111367,63
T-he two pending class action lawsuits brought under Section 1367.63
of the California statute are before the Superior Court for the County
of Los Angeles." The plaintiffs are making identical claims against
two large insurance companies. " Of the two suits, Cox v. Health Net
of California, Inc. is further along in litigation so it is the focus of this
article's examination. o
TFhe first cause of action against the insurers is tor breaching their health plan
contracts in violation of Section 1367.63 by applying a policy of denying
all claims for the reconstructive surgery of excess skin following weight
loss from bariatric surgery.39I The second cause of action is for violating
the Unfair Competition Lax (UCL).32
Although it is uncertain whether these suits will make it to trial, thex serve
as the first precedents for litigating under this sweeping provision of the
statute." In the event that these cases make it to trial and the court interprets
the meaning of Section 1367.63, the court will likely have difficulty
interpreting and applying the statute's language to specific procedures in
determining whether they are reconstructive.34
ID, Overview of the NneeainDcrn
IThe nondelegation doctrine is a constitutionally rooted separation ofpowers
principle that prevents the legislature from delegating legislative power
to another branch of government.3 However, beginning in the twentieth
century, legislatures at the state and federal level began delegating broad
discretionary authority to unelected administrative agencies to regulate
complex areas that exceeded the capacity of lawx makers' expertise and .was
limited by time restraints. As a result of lawmakers' lack of specialized
expertise in highly technical areas, legislators write laws deciding the
fundamental policy choices, while leaving the agency discretion to craft
and implement effective and efficient regulatory lawxs. 3
Noteably. the legislature cannot constitutionally vest limitless and ill-defined
authority to the administrative agencies and must provide a framework
of guiding principles for the agency to follows. ' This doctrine forces a
politically accountable legislature to make policy choices as opposed to
appointed adnministrative officials.39IThe Supreme Court in the nmodern era
has rejected this doctrine aind in oxver sixty years has upheld all delegations,
no matter hots broad, as proper delegations of authority.40
The Supremne Couirt's nondelegatin jurisprudence states that Congress
must prosvide "intelligible principles' in order to guide agencies' exercise
of their discretionary authority.41 By not striking doswn extremely broad
regulatory statutes, the Court has signaled its approxval ot delegating great
discretionary regulatory authority in areas of complex expertise, and also
that the Court, like Congress, is ill-equipped to draw the appropriate lines.42
In /istretta: vUnited States, Justice Scalia, the only modern advocate of the
doctrine sitting on the Court, argued in sole dissent that Congress delegation
was improper because the U.S. Sentencing Commission possessed broad
discretion to make "value judgments and policy assessments." 1Further.,
the Court has held it unconstitutional for Congress to transfer legislative
functions without imposing procedural safeguards curbing illegitimate
exercises of discretionary authority.44
The WICRA is both an example of a constitutional delegation of regulatory
power and an instructive paradigm for statutorily mandating insurance
coverage for a specitic surgical procedure meant to produce aesthetic
normality by applying well-defined objective standards not susceptible to
impeimissibly flexible administrative interpretations.
E, TIlhe Federal Wome's eath oand, Canc ,-er Righ ,ts
Act of 1998
T-he WICR A mandates insurance coverage for all stages of breast
reconstruction for individuals receiving benefits for medically necessary
mastectomies.45 This coverage extends to surgical procedures solely meant
to produce symmetrical appearance, an aesthetic criterion.46 Additionally,
this law does not equate to unrestricted coverage based on a subjective,
autonomous decision by the patient.47 This law, narrowly tailored in its
purpose, carefully defines the individuals it seeks to cover and does not
broadly mandate coverage for a general area of surgery.
III Ana IvsIS
Despite the reluctance of the judiciary to accept the application of the
nondelegation doctrine, California courts should hear a challenge applying
the doctrine to the California statute. Although the pending lawsuits are
not facial challenges to the law's constitutionality, they may interpret
the meaning of "reconstructive surgery" and serve as the first examples
of litigation to guide future challenges made under the poorly crafted
§ 1367.63.49
A, ThI-ie P e nd ing CIa s s A ctJionSui ts Se r ve asGu i d epost S
for Litigating Under thefClifo-,rnia S1ta-tute
The main issue the court must resolve is whether judicial review is currently
proper for this case. lealth Net, the Defendant insurer, correctly argues
that the DMIC has exclusive jurisdiction over this action because the
plaintiff's claims call for the determination of Health Net's regulatory
compliance with a provision in the Knox-Keene Act. Ihe court in Schmidt
v Foundation Health expressed concern noting that when a legislature
intends an agency to occupy "completely the field of health service plans,"
one must be cautions of any intrusion into the agency 's function bx seeking
remedies in other xvenues." Although the statutc is silent on this issue,
California case laxv suggests an indixvidual should havc a prixvatc rigbt of
action in this circumstance.5 3
Altbough IHealtb Net acknoxxledges tbat individuals can sue lot acts made
unlaxxful bx the Knox-Kcene Act, it narroxvly tends the act and emphasizes
that the laxx does not specifically outlaxw haxving a policy of irefusing to coxver
the surgical removal of excess skin folloxxing xxeight loss due to batiatric
surgery for morbid obesity.54 Although this plain meaning reading is
persuasixve, a court wxill likely folloxx Samnura v Raiser' Foundation H~ealthi
Plan and read the statute to allow a private right of action because Health
Net is accused of the unlawful act of violating § 1367.63 by refusing to
cover a surgery falling under its mandate.
Even though a private right of action likely exists, the court ,will probably
not issue a ruling on the legal meaning of "reconstructive surgery" until the
DMHC completes its non-routine survey examining Health Net's statutory
compliance as the judicial trend gives deference to the expertise of the
agency.56
H ealth Net properly invokes the doctrines of judicial abstention and
California's primary jurisdiction doctrine in their defense.57 1mploying
these legal theories frames the legal debate as a regulatory issue not
currently ripe for judicial review.
G, caU nc'~" ,eof,\,Each Rkf Requ,,\est sBstA,
Judicial abstention is proper for this suit because the coverage requests
made by each plaintiff within the class action are unique to the facts and
circumstances of each request and are most appropriate for the DMIC,
experts in health care and tasked to enforce compliance with the statute.
to initially determine the insurer's regulatory compliance. Similar to
Alvarado i. Selma Convalescent flospital, where the court affirmed the
trial court's demurrer to a class action lawsuit that alleged a skilled nursing
facility did not adequately provide care for residents, the claims made
against Health Net involve complex health care matters where judicial
involvement would assume the regulatory function of the agency.
Due to the variety of individual patient pathologies represented in this
class action suit and the complex economic and health care implications
of issuing broad declaratory and injunctive relief requiring Health Net to
cease its alleged blanket policy' and to 'review' or 're-review' each claim
for coverage as 'reconstructive surgery' under Section 1367.63, the court
will likely defer to the DMHC initially to make a conclusion on Health
Net's regulatory compliance.o Although the DMIIC has already ordered
lealth Net to cover the representative plaintiff's surgery, tis order was only
for the plaintiff's specific surgery and not for the entire class of plaintifts as
the pending non-routine survey examines.6 1
ii H~ hay JuistdonDockn e & heerly
A,-d,, caus'Je a ria meDlae
& remet A er MeDMHC
The California Supreme Court declared that the primary jurisdiction
doctrine applies when a plaintiff brings a claim in court but a statute
has delegated enforcement to an administrative body.62 If applied, this
doctrine suspends tbe judicial piocess until the administratixve body reaches
a conclusion on the disputed issue.' Since the legislature xested exclusixe
authority in the DMHC~ and thc DMHC is currently conducting a non-
routine surv ex exvaluating Health Net's compliance xxith Section 1367.63.
it is the DHM C's statutoty duty to complete its evaluation beforc a court
orders injunctixve rclicf.64
T hus, as expressed in S'amuzra, an indixvidual has a judicial remedy tom
xviolations ot actions made unlaxxtul undet tbe Knox-Keene Akct it tbe agency
tasked to enforce regulatory compliance fails to do so.6 5 Since the statute
expressly tasks the DMHC to enforcc Section 1367.63, indixviduals should
only have a private right of action if administrative redress is incapable
of making the plaintiff whole and the DMHC completes its non-routine
survey by issuing its final order regarding Health Net's compliance.66
IFurther, if the court holds that all excess skin is
an "abnormal structure of the body," and broadly
orders insurers to cover its removal regardless of the
individual patient's circumstances, it would be deciding
a medical policy question that it is ill-equipped to
answer.6 This would set a poor precedent by allowing
the statute to become susceptible to manipulation in
covering other surgeries not traditionally thought of as
reconstructive.
As a result, the DMHC is best qualified to make an
initial judgment in this specialized and complex area
that will likely lead the court to issue a stay and defer
to the agency prior to interpreting the meaning of
Section 1367.63 and judicially resolving Health Net's
statutory compliance. Although the suits are not facial
challenges to the law's constitutionality and will likely
only exhibit the difficult application of its language,
a challenge under the nondelegation doctrine is one
method to invalidate the statute itself
Similar to the federal New Deal legislation struck
down in Schechter Poultry Corp. v United Sates, the
California legislature cannot delegate its lawmaking
authoritx to another body of government. The
California Supreme Court stated that in interpreting a
statute, courts should determine the legislature's intent
to effectuate the purpose of the law and that laws
must not give an administrative agency the ability to
exercise greater discretion than is necessary to achieve
the laxxw's purpose."
In Schechter, the Court recognized the need for
regulations focusing on a "host of issues with which
the national legislature cannot deal directly," while
also acknowledging that Congress cannot individually
police every area of regulation. Although it is
improper for the California legislature to undermine
the necessary regulatory function of the DMHC by
enforcing and crafting complex health care regulatory
laws itself, it cannot constitutionally delegate total
lawmaking power to the DMI IC.
The California legislators failed to craft a sufficiently
specific enabling act in accordance with the Supreme
Court's requisite standard of providing intelligible
principles for the DMHC to follow. In order to be
reconstructive, the California statute merely requires
that the surgery must correct or repair an "abnormal
structure of the body."" T'Ihe statute does not define
the meaning of abnormal structure and, as a result,
consistent application and interpretation by the DM1IC,
insurers, and physicians as to what conditions constitute
an abnormal structure of the body is doubtful."
Further, the statute broadly defines an eligible
justification for having reconstructive surgery as to
create a "normal appearance, to the extent possible."
T-his language creates an impermissibly flexible and
subjective statute susceptible to interpretive problems.
By using subjective language like "normal." the
legislators removed obljective predictability and gave
the DMHC virtually unfettered discretionary authority
in coverage decisions." This wording creates the
possibility for patients to shop around for a doctor who
will certif that his/her excess skin is an "abnormal
structure of the body" caused by a "disease," and that
the surgery should be covered because the removal of
excess skin would create more than a minimal aesthetic
improvement in achieving a "normal appearance"
according to the doctor's personal opinion.74
The DMHC, insurers, and physicians need detailed
guidance on how to consistently and objectively
determine if a patient's requested surgery is recon-
structixve. IUder the statute's current construction, one
may argue that a particulai piocedure is reconstructive
surgery exven though it only coiiects a slight aesthetic
abnoimalitx wxithin nmedically normal ranges.7
IThe statute also tails to define xwhat conditions should
be characterized as a "disease" and since there is no
unitormly accepted definition as to xxhat constitutes a
disease the DM1HC again does nut have the necessary
"intelligible principles' to determine wxhat conditions
the legislature intended to be considered a disease
under the statute.77 The example regarding the surgical
removal of excess skin that fails to retract following the
treatment of obesity with bariatric surgery exemplifies
the difficulty of classifying whether a disease, under
the statute's language, causes certain conditions
warranting classification as reconstructive surgery.
Arguably, the disease of obesity does not directly
cause the excess skin but merely is an unavoidable
side effect patients voluntarily accept by undergoing
the treatment of obesity with bariatric surgery.79 1I
contrast, it is also arguable that the treatment of excess
skin is merely a continuation of the treatment of the
patient's obesity and as a result, the disease of obesity
causes the excess skin. 0
Like the other provisions in the California statute, the
legislators failed to define what constitutes "improve[d]
function."" Since varying degrees of functional
improvements exist, this term is also susceptible to
subjective interpretation." For example, although
hanging skin can pose problems when it reaches a
certain level, not all excess skin poses problems.83 The
sweeping statute is not helpful to allow or individual
considerations regarding coverage deterninations to
a diverse patient population.84 Arguably, having this
excess skin has a negative psychological effect on the
patient and, as a result, the surgery is reconstructive
because it would improve mental health>. In a New
York civil court case, the court held that a seventeen-
year-old male's surgical excision of enlarged breast
tissue was covered under his policy because of the
psychological problems caused by the excess breast
tissue.86 By failing to sufficiently clarify whether
psychological justifications are alone sufficient for
coverage, the legislature again failed to provide the
necessary "intelligible principles" for the DMHC to
follow.
Although the legislature's intent was to provide
eligible individuals with the necessary compensation
for surgeries flalling under the statute's definition of
"reconstructive surger," by failing to adequately
define the necessary conditions that must be present
to consistently effectuate this intent, the California
legislators sviolated the nondelegation doetrine by
alloysilg the DMHC to improperly exercise a greater
amount of diseretion than ncessary to fulfill the
legislature's intent.
By mandating insurance eompanies to reimburse all
procedures under its broad definition of reconstructive
surgery, the legislature improperly vested the DMIC
with conplex policy assessments." Although mod-
ern jurisprudence shows an extreme reluctance to
striike down regulatory delegations of power. recent
case law upholding broad legislative delegations is
distinguishable from the subject matter ofthe California
statute. California's jurisprudence states that to prevent
unelected agencies from improperly rendering policy
decisions, the legislature must utilize a "yardstick" for
the administrative agency to follow.89
In Loving v United States. the Supreme Court rejected
a nondelegation doctrine challenge to the President's
prescription of aggravating factors in an Executive
Order for the imposition of the death penalty in the
military.90 The Code failed to define the "aggravating"
and "mitigating" factors to be considered and as a
result, the President exercised discretionary authority
by issuing an executive order specifying these factors.9
Although Loving argued that the President lacked
authority to define the aggravating factors enabling
the military court to issue a death sentence, the Court
rejected the nondelegation doctrine theory emphasizing
the long history of the chief executive making rules
for the military and noted that it gives Congress great
deference in organizing military affairs.'
In contrast to the subject matter in Loving dealing with
the long tradition of giving deference to the executive
branch in making military rules, the California
legislature's delegation vests unchecked health care
regulatory and policy making authority in the hands
of an unelected agency. Unlike the President's
constitutional action in Loving, the California legisla-
ture delegated its exclusive constitutionally rooted
laysmaking power to an unelected and unaccountable
body of administrative officials without adequately
clear regulations. 94 TYhe far-reaching language of
the statute forces the DMIC to improperly make
economic policy judgments by mandating insurers to
cover a fiscally unsustainable amount of claims that
may have the unintended consequence of causing
insurers to provide unaffordable health care plans. As
a result of the vast effect this may have on California
residents. eleeted laysmakers, not appointed ageney
offieials, aie the proper indisviduals to make these
significant deeisions.
In Kugier v. ocum, the Calitornia Supreme Court held
that the legislatuire properls made the fundanmental
policy deternminatioin that wvages for firemen in
one area should be in parits xxith another and that
the delegated povwer to effectuate this deeision
xxas proper)6  In contrast to Kuglerin, the California
legislature failed to make fundamnental poliey choices
and allowed the DM1HC to potentially mandate vast
insurance coverage for surgeries which may threaten
the long term financial vitality of California's health
care system. Based on the vague language chosen by the
California legislature in the statute, there is no sufficient
"yardstick" in California preventing the DMHC from
improperly rendering policy assessments.
D.Th a frnaStatulte P,,rovi1111des
InufcetProcedural SaJ0fegu,,.,,ards to
Ad1equ,,-,ately Cu,,rb the DMHC's
D is cr et i on ar y Aut it hori ty
California jurisprudence suggests that procedural safe-
guards checking the delegated body's potential abuse of
power are more important than substantive regulations
in examining the constitutionality of a statutory delega-
tion of power.95 Further, the California Supreme Court
has noted that it is unconstitutional for a legislature to
delegate authority without establishing a mechanism
to assure the proper implementation of its policy deci-
sions.99 Although there are minor safeguards within the
California statute, the protective checks that limit the
exercise of agency discretion are inadequate.100
In California Air Constitiency .ialfornia State
Air Resources Board, the California Supreme Court
determined that the legislature provided sufficient
procedural safeguards that checked the California State
Resources Board's discretionary authority to delay a
program meant to control automobile emissions.101
Unlike the enabling act in State Air Resources that
provided safeguards mitigating the potential abuse
of discretionary power, the DMHC has the power to
make sweeping coverage conclusions without adequate
safeguards checking its discretion.102
Under the California statute, if the insurer denies a
claim, a patient may challenge the insurer's decision by
requesting an Independent Medical Review (IMR) of
the health plan's decision to deny coverage under which
medical records and other relevant information to the
coverage determination are examined by an independent
third party.103 Even if the DMHC approves an IMR
and it concludes that the coverage decision deserves
compensation, the Director of the DMIC is still the
final arbiter and possesses much discretionary latitude in
penalizing non-compliance.104
Although the statute does not explicitly provide or
deny a prixvate right of action or mandate that claimants
exhaust their channels of administratixve redress under
the administrativ e procedures in place, the barriers to
challenge the D)MIHC's coxerage decisions create an
almost insunnountable banrier tor indiv idual claimants
to pursue. In order to receiv e reimbursementk a claimant
can eithei go through a long administratixve griexvance
system with the ultimate final decision making ability
residing in the DMIC's Director, or the claimant can
begin a costly litigation battle in civil court against
well capitalized insurance companies. T-hus, with
the onerous and lengthy grievance process currently
available to individual claimants, and the fact that
insurer's resources dwarf those of individual claimants,
the procedures currently in place fail to assure that the
DMHC's discretionary power is exercised in a proper
and fair manner.
Unlike the Charter Schools Act upheld in Ilson v State
Board of' Education on the grounds that the legislature
properly made fundamental policy decisions andprovided
adequate safeguards to protect against the State Board of
Education's abuse of discretionary power, the California
health care statute fails to sufficiently curb the DMHC's
discretionary power. i0Even though the legislative
intent is to ensure coverage for eligible individuals
that meet the definition of reconstructive surgery set
forth in the act, the procedural safeguards set forth by
the legislature are insufficient to both successfully
implement the statute's intent and to prevent abuse of
the DMIC's enforcement power because the safeguards
do not provide sufficiently detailed definitions or the
DMHC to follow.
In considering whether the statute's procedural safeguards
are reasonable, a court will consider the magnitude of the
interests afflected by the legislative grant of authority.10
In contrast to the act upheld in Wilson that properly
delegated discretionary authority to those with the
particularized educational knowledge and with a great
vested interest in the quality of the educational system,
the DMHC is an unaccountable agency tasked to enforce
statewide medical insurance decisions that may greatly
affect a claimant's greatest asset, life.107 The DMHC
makes health care coverage decisions that determine
the available surgical treatment options available to
patients and thus individuals affected by the DMIIC's
regulatory decisions have a much greater personal
interest at stake than the state residents and taxpayers
challenging the constitutionality of the Charter Schools
Act in 1W i/son.10s
As a result of the statute's insufficiently guiding
"intelligible principles," the great policy assessments
impropeily bestoxwed upon the DMHlC, and the lack of
adequate procedural sateguards effectively curbing the
f)MH C's discretioary authority, the C'alifornia statute
is n fiting example for a constitutional challenge under
the nondelegation doctrine. Until n facial challenge to
the C alitfornia lnxx occurs, the pending laxwsuits xwill
likelx shoxv the laxx's interpretixve difficulties and could
put insurers in financially unstable positions creating
concern oxver their fiuture ability to afford coxvering
individuals who are at heightened risk of needing
medically indicated surgical procedures in the future.10
Given the increasingly vast amount of costly
procedures that do not fit clearly into either the
definition in Section 1367.63 of reconstructive or
cosmetic surgery, legislators may learn several lessons
from the construction of the statute.ii If a facial
challenge to the law is unsuccessful legislators should
amend the California statute and Congress should
not adopt the identical federal bill now before it."'
This article recommends following the strategies and
methods employed by the drafters of the WHCRA
and some insurance policies when drafting eligibility
criteria for statutes mandating coverage for specific
procedures."
With health care costs taking up a greater percentage of
this nation's resources, statutes require more detailed
criteria and careful drafting in order to ensure insurers
continue to offer affordable coverage that employers
will extend to employees.113 Statutes should not
contain broad definitions mxandating coverage for all
reconstructive surgeries but rather only once a certain
amount of insurance denials are made for a specific
procedure should a statute procedurally require the
DMHnC or other equivalent administrative agencies to
investigate the insurers compliance with the statute. If
the agency finds that insurers are not in compliance and
believe a specific statute covering a defined surgery
(similar to theWHCRA) is appropriate, a process
should be created where legislators debate and decide
whether to write a law mandating insurance coverage
for patients that meet detailed medical eligibility
requirements for the specific procedure recommended
by the agency.114
Under the statute's current construction, virtually
any surgical procedure is arguably deserving of
coverage." Adopting this proposition would: (1)
ensure that legislators are not wasting their time
craming legislation for every rare procedure denied
coverage by insurers; (2) save scarce judicial
resources by utilizing the expertise of the DM1IC or
equivalent administrative agencies to make initial but
limited cosvemage determinations' and (3) sufficiently
place lassmaking and policy authority in the elected
legislatume by allovwing them to balance die fiscal ability
of insurance companies (and indirectly on indixvidual
consumers of health care) to cov em cer'tain procedures
and the desire to followv the agency 's recommendation
to hasve specific surgeries univ ersally coyvered.11i6
Once legislators beoin drafting the legislation, they
should narrossly tailor the language, much like the
WHI CRBA, in order to ensure that only those intended
to receive coverage actually do."
Implementation of laws that mandate coverage for
reconstructive surgery lor the sole purpose of eliciting
'normal appearance' without further guidelines is not
advisable. If California lawmakers wish to keep the
statute's basic definitions, the legislators should amend
the statute to mandate the utilization of an objective
method like the Pittsburgh Rating Scale to mitigate the
statute's susceptibility to inconsistent and subjective
interpretation.III Although a physician's treatment
decision always holds a degree of subjectivity in
deciding the appropriate treatment strategy for
patients, the standard currently utilized in California
and in the proposed Reconstruction Act of 2007 is
greatly susceptible to subjectivity and will necessarily
lead to unpredictable results in insurance coverage.19
The WHCRA is a guiding example requiring an
objective basis for determining whether a surgery is
coverable.12
In contrast to the Califoinia statute that employs
inherently subjective language like 'normal" and
'abnormal,' the WHCRA uses the word 'symmetrical'
to describe the eligibility for reimbursement."
Although the WHCRA does not define 'symmetrical'
and is not as numerically quantitative as the Pittsburgh
Rating Scale, courts can more objectively interpret the
popular meaning of 'symmetrical' than the language
in the California statute.122 By selecting a word that
has a quantifiable definition, the language chosen in
the WCHIRA serves as a useful precedent to guide
legislators in amending the statute's language.
Another method of solving the statute's deficiencies
would be to return to the old lass's standard covering
only those surgeries that will cause functional
improvements. Ilowever, if amended, legislators
should specifically include psychological functioning
in the statute as a sufficient justification for cover-
age. 123 Adding psychological impairments into the
statute's language appeases the law's advocates who
noted in the congressional debate that the old law
failed to take into account the psychological trauma
that accompanies phy sical disfiguirement.124 Providing
authoritatisve documentation of the ph>ysiological or
psy chological imnpairment should be required to receisve
coserage. iF Since plastic surgeons are not qualified
to diagnose psy chological affiictions, patients claiming
a psychological justification should either obtain a
certitied psy chologist or psychiatrist to diagnose or
piesent a documented psycehological difficult> directly
cazused by their condition.,
Lassmakers should also amend the statute to specifically
require objective and up to date scientific criteria in
making their decisions on: (1) which surgeries elicit
functional improvements; 2) whether the condition
is an abnormal structure of the body; and (3) whether the surgery will
elicit a normal appearance.) 6 Objective criteria and rating systems like
the Pittsburgh Rating Scale, should be required to more consistently
and accurately determine whether the desired surgery is cosmetic or
reconstructive.127
X\\,\ Conclusion
Although a successful facial challenge to a statute using the nondelegation
doctrine has not occurred on the federal level since the New Deal Era, the
California statute is a fitting example for employing this doctrine at the
state level. The statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to an
administrative agency by failing to provide adequate guiding principles for
the DMIC to follow, by allowing an unelected agency to make complex
policy decisions, and by lacking the necessary procedural safeguards
needed to curb the DM1HIC's discretionary authority.
As the line between cosmetic and reconstructive surgery blurs and health
care costs make up an increasing amount of our GDP, statutes need more
definitive standards for regulatory agencies, insurers, and physicians
to folloxw. The ambiguous California statute, though well intentioned,
requires a consistent and accurate method to determine whether the desired
surgery is cosmetic or reconstructive as intended by its crafters. Laxxmakers
need to make a policy choice balancing the need to treat the necessary
patients and conserving increasingly scarce economic resources. Even
though the California statute is in accordance with the AMA's definitions
of reconstructive and cosmetic surgery, its construction is fundamentally
flawed in mandating coverage of all procedures within its vague and
subjective definition of reconstructive surgery. Health care insurance
statutes require objective and precise statutory standards capable of long-
term fiscal sustainability as opposed to poorly defined sxweeping insurance
mandates in order to most accurately and efficiently reimburse patients for
the appropriate surgical procedures.
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